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Conjuring Innocence: An Anecdote
During the protracted, six week trial ofJohn C. Salvi III, Richard Seron
and the accused's parents, John Jr. and Anne Marie Salvi, chanced to
cross paths a number of times in the dim hallways of Dedham's antique
courthouse. Against all likelihood, they started to engage in some amica-
ble dialogue and gradually, over numerous vending machine cokes, suc-
ceeded in developing a comfortable association. Following the conviction
of their only child, the Salvi's began to correspond with Seron on a regu-
lar basis and to exchange numerous telephone calls as well.
Death for "Young John" Salvi arrived promptly one morning in
Cellblock 3 at Cedar Junction, the infamous maximum security state
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prison. It was late November and young Salvi was dead, a mere eight
months into his double-life stretch. Within weeks of Salvi's death, a suc-
cessful motion for the abatement of all his criminal indictments and con-
victions was filed. The slate was clean.
Eight months passed and on a scorching August morning, John Jr.,
Anne Marie and I met for breakfast at the I-HOP down by the state line
in Salem, New Hampshire. I ordered pancakes; the Salvis' ordered eggs.
Time passed agreeably enough until, in the course of some innocuous
table banter, Anne Marie forgot herself and hazarded onto the subject of
her dead son's criminal abatement. It seemed she was the one who had
pushed most vigorously for it, and now, she was quite satisfied and
proud for having succeeded.
I, on the other hand, could feel nothing but frustration and so
began to lament about how the abatement might ruin my claim for the
$100,000 reward. Abatement was a massive stumbling-block in my
path and I did not feel too kindly about it. Abatement made possible the
immediate dismissal of my case, upon a motion by the defense - my
cause of action might face sudden death on Day One.
Now, after hearing all this, Anne Marie looked more than a little
bit pale. She began to recite very gravely that instead of being the nega-
tive thing I had just described, abatement was truly a blessing that had
given some measure of peace to her husband and to herself Almost mag-
ically, abatement had assuaged the guilt of Young John and it had
cleansed his family name as well. And that was that.
Later on, while driving home, I reflected on the meaning of the terse
exchange between myself and one very grief-stricken mother. I could un-
derstand her pain and despair. But I realized that, in trying to fix
things, Anne Marie had inadvertently complicated my life. I also knew
that the Salvi abatement was continuing to generate afirestorm of public
indignation. The Salvis' had conjured innocence for their dead son
through abatement, and it made them feel better. But nobody else was
buying into it - nobody.
- RichardJ Seron
On November 16, 1993, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.
(PPFA), and the National Abortion Federation (NAF) announced
at ajoint news conference the establishment of a $1 million reward
fund to help solve attacks on abortion clinics.' News of the an-
1 The first newspaper to break the news was the Lancaster New Era:
Rewards of up to $100,000 are being offered for information lead-
ing to convictions in nearly 50 unsolved arsons, bombings and chemical
attacks on abortion clinics and family planning centers, including the
firebombing of the Lancaster Planned Parenthood.
The National Abortion Federation and the Planned Parenthood
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nouncement was carried nationwide. Since that time PPFA and
Federation of America announced the creation of the reward fund to-
day in response to increasing violence directed at women's reproductive
services throughout the nation.
The Sept. 29 firebombing of the local clinic did more than
$150,000 worth of damage. In Lancaster, Planned Parenthood counsels
and refers women seeking abortions and is an advocate of abortion
choice, but it does not perform the medical procedure.
The local attack came on the heels of a $1.4 million arson fire of a
family planning clinic in Bakersfield, Calif. That case also remains
unsolved.
Anyone with information about attacks on abortion or family plan-
ning providers should call 1-800-772-9100. All callers' identities will be
kept confidential.
Up to $100,000 Offered for Clinic Bombing Information, LANCASTER NEW ERa, Nov. 16,
1993, at C6.
The Lancaster IntelligencerJournal followed with a longer story the next day:
Escalating violence surrounding the abortion issue has prompted a
mysterious donor to pledge $100,000 for information about the Sept. 29
firebombing of Lancaster's Planned Parenthood office. The reward is
part of "at least" $1 million made available for leads in similar incidents
nationwide, according to Gina Shaw, spokeswoman for the National
Abortion Federation in Washington, D.C....
Nancy Osgood, director of Planned Parenthood of Lancaster
County, hopes the hard-hitting, high-dollar reward effort will bring re-
sults. "Clearly, $100,000 for each case solved is a lot of money," she said.
"So in our case, if one person came up with the information ... they
would be eligible. They would get the $100,000, as long as they cooper-
ated." . . .
The rewards were announced Tuesday at a joint press conference
in the nation's capital, where representatives of the NAF were joined by
officials from the Planned Parenthood Federation of America, andJohn
Magaw, director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.
Rewards of up to $100,000 are being offered for information lead-
ing to the arrest and conviction of those responsible for "abortion clinic
bombings, arsons, and criminal acts of vandalism that have occurred in
various locations throughout the country," according to a statement is-
sued by the ATF.
David Griffith, $100,000 Reward Offered in Clinic Bombing Here, INTELLIGENCERJ., Nov.
17, 1993, at Al.
2 Other newspapers across the country also carried the story the following day:
A $1 million reward fund will be offered to help solve cases of vio-
lent attacks against abortion clinics, including the torching of a Rich-
mond health center, two abortion rights groups and a federal agency
announced yesterday.... To solve past crimes, the National Abortion
Federation and Planned Parenthood Federation of America offered re-
wards of up to $100,000 per case from what they called the largest re-
ward fund ever established to help crack anti-abortion violence
cases.... Federal agents will man a 24-hour, toll-free hotline for tips
about arson, bombings and terrorism at abortion and family planning
clinics. The number is (800) ATF-4867.
Peter Hardin, Reward Fund Targets Attacks on Abortion Clinics, RiCHMOND TIMES-DIS-
PATCH, Nov. 17, 1993, at Al. See also Michael Ross, Senate Passes Bill to Curb Anti-abortion
Violence, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Nov. 17, 1993, at Al ("abortion rights supporters
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NAF have reaffirmed the reward offer after every serious abortion
clinic attack,' including the December 30, 1994 Brookline, Massa-
chusetts clinic shootings.4
took their own step to protect clinics, announcing that they will pay up to $100,000
for anonymous tips leading to convictions in 25 unsolved cases. Rewards for tips...
will come from a $2.5 million fund started largely with money from an anonymous
donor."); Randall Edwards, Reward Fund Set Up for Abortion Clinic Arsons, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, Nov. 17, 1993, at 2B ("The National Abortion Federation and the Planned
Parenthood Federation of America announced the reward fund yesterday at a news
conference in Washington. Local news conferences, such as the one at the YWCA in
Columbus, were scheduled across the country to coincide with the announcement.");
Senate Oks Bill to Curb Violence by Abortion Foes, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 17, 1993, at
4A; Dawn Webber, Rewards of up to $100,000 Offered to Stem Violence at Abortion Clinics,
LA. DAILY NEWS, Nov. 17, 1993, at N4; Michael Ross, Protection for Abortion Clinics Voted
by Senate Legislation, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at 1; Stephen Buttry, Omahans Hope
Fund Cuts Abortion-Clinic Violence, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Nov. 17, 1993, at 1; Mary
Beth Lane, Reward Offered to Find Abortion Clinic Bombers, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland,
Ohio), Nov. 17, 1993, at 13A; Rewards Offered in Clinic Attacks, PREss-ENTERPRISE (River-
side, CA), Nov. 17, 1993, at A6; Mimi Hall, $100,000 Reward in Clinic Attacks, USA
TODAY, Nov. 17, 1993, at 3A; and Helen Dewar, Abortion Clinics Voted Protection, WASH.
POST, Nov. 17, 1993, at Al.
3 E.g., newspapers across the country announced the PPFA and NAF offer of
$100,000 reward after a fatal shooting at a clinic in Pensacola, FL, and a firebombing
at Falls Church, Va. See U.S. Marshals Dispatched to Guard Clinics, ARIz. REPUBLIC, July
31, 1994, at A8; At a Glance, Accused Killer is Relaxed in the Dock, ATLANTA CONST., July
31, 1994, at A6; Judy Lundstrum Thomas, Marshals to Guard Abortion Clinics, AUSTIN
AM.-STATESMAN, July 31, 1994, at Al; Authorities Probe Arson Behind Abortion Clinic, BAL-
TIMORE SUN,July 31, 1994, at 17A; Reward Offered in Va. Clinic Fire, BOSTON GLOBE,July
31, 1994, at 22; Clues Sought in Va. Clinic Firebombing, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 31, 1994, at
3; Clinic Target of Arson Attempt, DES MOINES REG., July 31, 1994, at 2; Nation in Brief,
SUNDAY PATRIOT-NEWS, July 31, 1994, at A14; Suspect Sought in Virginia Fire, HOUSTON
CHRON., July 31, 1994, at 22; Fire at Virginia Abortion Clinic Causes Minor Damage, INDI-
ANAPOLIS STAR,July 31, 1994, at A14; Help Sought in Virginia Abortion-Clinic Fire, ORANGE
COUNTY REG., July 31, 1994, at A27; Arson Investigated at Abortion Clinic, PITTSBURGH
POsT-GAZETTE, July 31, 1994, at A12; Jim Mason, Fire Set Behind Va. Clinic, Groups Offer
Reward, RiCHMOND TIME-s-DISPATCH, July 31, 1994, at A2; Agents Seek Help in Finding
Suspect in Arson at Virginia Abortion Clinic, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 31, 1994, at
72A; Public's Help Sought Over Fire at Va. Clinic, SEATTLE TIMES, July 31, 1994, at A2; Fire
Set at Abortion Clinic in Va., ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 31, 1994, at 3A; Abortion Clinic
Arson Probed, TULSA WoR.,July 31, 1994, at N14; Lorraine Woellert, Hot Line Gets Tips
on Clinic Bombing, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1994, at C6.
A $100,000 reward was also announced after arsons at a family planning clinic in
Cloquet, Minn., and a Planned Parenthood office in Brainerd, Minn. See Allie Shah &
Rhonda Hillbery, Brainerd Fire Determined to be Arson, STAR-TRIBUNE NEWSPAPER OF THE
TWIN CITIES, Aug. 12, 1994, at 1B; and Carolyn Pesce, Abortion Violence Hits Home,
Torching of Clinic Mars "Peaceful" Town, USA TODAY, Aug. 18, 1994, at 3A.
4 "The Washington-based National Abortion Federation joined Planned
Parenthood in offering a $100,000 reward for information leading to the arrest and
conviction of anyone involved in the attacks. (800) ATF-4867." Bob Hohler, Anguish
and Arguments Mark Nationwide Reaction, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 31, 1994, at 1. See also,
Helen Kennedy, Ralph Ranalli &Jack Meyers, Rampage! N.H. Suspect Hunted After Gun-
man Kills 2 at Brookline Abortion Clinics, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 31, 1994, at 1; Robert W.
Trott (AP), 2 Killed, 5 Wounded at Clinics, BUFFALO NEWS, Dec. 31, 1994, at A3; Robert
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On September 29, 1994, ninety days before the Brookline
clinic shootings, NAF published a news release reaffirming that it
was offering a standing award of $100,000 per incident for informa-
tion leading to the arrest and conviction of any person responsible
for murder or serious acts of vandalism at abortion and family
planning clinics. The news release stated in part:
We call upon the press to stop giving celebrity status to extrem-
ists through interviews and talk shows, to stop giving them a plat-
form for justifying their violence. Just as we do not give a
platform to kidnappers or international hijackers, we should not
give a platform to these criminals. And we particularly call upon
responsible leaders in the anti-abortion community to join us in
deploring the violence advocated in [the Army of God] manual.
We want to remind the anti-abortion community that there is a
$100, 000 per incident reward for information leading to the arrest and
conviction of any person responsible for murder or serious acts of vandal-
ism at abortion and family planning clinics.5
This News Release was circulated to Preterm Health Services where
Richard J. Seron was employed. Preterm Health Services was a
family planning and abortion provider in Brookline, Massachu-
setts. Seron's duties were split as a part-time facilities worker and a
part-time security guard.
On December 30, 1994, Seron was working as a facilities
worker, stocking and checking supplies in the storage room, when
John C. Salvi III entered Preterm Health Services and launched an
armed attack with a high capacity assault weapon, killing Lee Ann
Nichols, a clinic employee, and wounding another person. Un-
known to anyone at Preterm, Salvi had already visited the Planned
Parenthood Center of Greater Boston, also in Brookline, killing
Shannon Lowney,6 a clinic employee, and wounding two other
persons.
Although Seron had been instructed by his employer not to
fire his weapon except in self-defense, he opened the storage room
W. Trott (AP), 2 Slain in 'Domestic Terrorism,' 7 Shot at 2 Abortion Clinics, HOUSTON
CHRON., Dec. 31, 1994, at 1; Elizabeth Mehren &JohnJ. Goldman, 2 Killed, 5 Wounded
in Shootings at 2 Abortion Clinics, L.A. TiMES, Dec. 31, 1994, at 1; Fran Bauer, Area Clinics
Call for Tighter Security, MILWAUK EJ., Dec. 31, 1994; at A6; Nell Porter Brown & Mark
Hamblett, Trail of Terror, Police Hunt Clinic Killer, PATRIOT LEDGER, Dec. 31, 1994, at 1;
and Joyce Price, Rifleman Slays Two Women at Abortion Clinics, Attacker Escapes After Bos-
ton, WASi. TiMES, Dec. 31, 1994, at Al.
5 NAF News Release, Statement: Sylvia Stengle re. release of "Army of God" underground
anti-abortion manual, Sept. 29, 1994, at 2 (emphasis added) (on file with authors).
6 Shannon E. Lowney graduated from Boston College magna cum laude with a
Bachelor of Arts degree in history in 1991. Dan Kennedy, Tragedy on Beacon Street, B.C.
L. ScH. MAG., Fall 1997, at 17.
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door and engaged in a shoot out with Salvi at close range, approxi-
mately five feet between them. This exchange of gun fire resulted
in Salvi fleeing the building, leaving behind his black bag that con-
tained seven hundred rounds of reserve ammunition, a Ruger pis-
tol, and certain crucial gun store receipts. During the shoot-out,
Seron suffered four gunshot wounds to his arms and left hand re-
sulting in serious injuries while many of Salvi's shots narrowly
missed him. By his actions in the face of superior firepower, Seron
saved the life of Jane Sauer who was being fired upon at the very
moment Seron opened the storage room door. He also saved the
lives of at least eight other people in an adjacent room, preventing
an abortion clinic massacre of historic proportion.7
Based on the information and evidence provided by Seron
and from Salvi's abandoned duffel bag, law enforcement authori-
ties traced the serial number on the pistol and the names on the
gun store receipts, leading to the speedy identification and arrest
of the assailant, John C. Salvi, III, for the shootings at the Brook-
line clinics.8 Seron received private and public recognition for
stemming the loss of life during the attack and for capturing physi-
cal evidence -that led to Salvi's swift identification,9 arrest" and
7 Michael D. Lemonick, An Armed Fanatic Raises the Stakes, TIME MAc., Jan. 9, 1995,
at 34 ("The final toll in the two-day shooting spree was two dead and five wounded.
Were it not for security guard Richard Seron's quick reflexes, the casualties could
have been much higher: Salvi's abandoned satchel also contained a second gun and
700 rounds of ammunition.").
For a meticulous analysis of the entire shooting incident at Preterm, see Massad
Ayoob, Terror in the Clinic: The Brookline Pre-Term Incident, AM. HANDGUNNER, May/June
1995, at 50 ("In this case, Seron fulfilled his mission: once he engaged Salvi, the kill-
ing stopped. Lee Ann Nichols was already dead, and Jane Sauer already down, when
Seron carried the action to the killer and turned a wholesale murder into a gunfight
with no further innocent casualties except Seron's own wounds." Id. at 94. "Had
[Seron] fled .... Salvi would almost certainly have executed Jane Sauer and then
hosed the nearby waiting room, killing or maiming eight to a dozen more victims
before proceeding to the target-rich environment of the medical service area up-
stairs." Id. at 95).
8 Catherine S. Manegold, Though Hunt for Suspect Was Vast, Chance Proved Crucial
for Capture, N.Y. TiMrs NAT'L, Jan. 2, 1995, at 10:
As they pieced together the events, police learned that the gunman had
exchanged fire with a security guard at the Preterm clinic. The security
guard, RichardJ. Seron, was wounded, but he unwittingly provided cru-
cial material that would soon identify the suspect. When [Seron] shot
at the assailant, the gunman left a duffel bag behind as he fled.
"'It's a ballistics case,' the law enforcement source said. 'We have him with the
gun before and after the shootings. The forensics are there. We have him ID'd at the
scene by the guard and other witnesses."' Judy Rakowsky, Salvi Pleads Not Guilty to
Charges, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 7, 1995, at 1, 6.
10 Although Salvi was arrested in Norfolk, Virginia, after a drive-by shooting at an
abortion clinic, it was the evidence provided from the duffel bag left behind by Salvi
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conviction.1
at Preterm that linked Salvi to the Brookline shootings. Shelley Murphy & Richard
Chacon, Clinic Shooting Suspect Captured, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Jan. 1, 1995, at 1;
Daniel Golden & Brian McGrory, N.H. Man Held in Brookline Deaths After Va. Facility
Hit, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Jan 1, 1995, at 1; and Manegold, supra note 11.
11 John Ellement, Guilty Verdict Sends Salvi to Prison for Life, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 19,
1996, at 1, 22.
Public recognition received by Seron includes a letter from Howard A. Brackett,
Chief of Police:
I want to thank and commend you for your action December 30,
1994 at the Pre-Term Clinic. There is no doubt in my mind, or [in] any of the
investigating officers [minds], that your action provided the evidence that led to
the arrest of John Salvi.
It is unfortunate that there was a homicide that day at Pre Term
and one at Planned Parenthood, 1031 Beacon Street. As a result of
your professionalism and bravery I am sure that further bloodshed was
prevented. As soon as you were aware of the situation you responded
and confronted Salvi in gunfire without regard to your own safety [that]
led to his arrest.
Your action momentarily confused Salvi and caused him to leave his bag
behind him. The evidence recovered at the scene led to John Salvi. Please ac-
cept my personal thanks for your assistance, which was pivotal in the
arrest of this extremely dangerous felon. I hope that things at the clinic
remain quiet and that you recover from your wounds completely.
Letter from Howard A. Brackett, Chief of Police, Town of Brookline, Mass., to Rich-
ard Seron (Jan. 23, 1995) (on file with authors).
Seron also received a commendation from the Massachusetts Senate, which states
in pertinent part:
Whereas, on December thirtieth, nineteen hundred and ninety-four an
alleged terrorist, John Salvi, allegedly launched surprise attacks on both
Planned Parenthood and Preterm Health Services in Brookline, killing
one person at Planned Parenthood; and
Whereas, the alleged murderer then drove to 1842 Beacon Street and
allegedly attacked Preterm Health Services, killing the receptionist, Le-
anne Nichols; and
Whereas, Richard Seron then opened the door to the crime scene, sur-
prising the terrorist, thus preventing the death of Preterm staffer, Jane
Sauer, who was being shot by the terrorist; and
Whereas, Richard Seron was shot at least four times in the arms and
hands by the terrorist, all the while returning gunfire to force the ter-
rorist to flee the building and leave behind a large black bag which led
to the terrorist's subsequent identification; and
Whereas, during the entire gunfight, the muzzle of the terrorist's semi-
automatic rifle was approximately sixty inches from Seron's face; and
Whereas, by his act of gallantry, in the face of superior firepower and
with utter disregard for his own life, Richard Seron saved the lives of
Jane Sauer and at least eight other people in an adjacent room and
prevented a massacre of historic proportion; . . . Now Therefore Be It
Resolved, that the Massachusetts Senate commends Richard Seron for his
outstanding bravery and heroism on December thirtieth, nineteen hun-
dred and ninety-four at the Preterm Health Services in Brookline; ....
Resolutions Honoring Richard Seron, Security Guard at Preterm Health Services in Brookline for
His Heroic Actions on December Thirtieth, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Four, Senate of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, adopted June 15, 1995 (on file with authors).
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In March 1996, Seron served as a key witness for the prosecu-
tion in the trial of Salvi, that resulted in Salvi's conviction on two
counts of first degree murder, five counts of attempted murder,
and a host of lesser charges.' 2 On March 18, 1996, Salvi was sen-
tenced to two mandatory life sentences without parole for first-de-
gree murder and an additional 20 years for attempted murder.'
Salvi's notice of appeal was filed March 22, 1996."4
Seron had earlier notified PPFA and NAF of his claim for the
$100,000.00 reward in letters addressed to each of them dated May
8, 1995.15 His letters stated in part:
By this letter, I stake my claim for the $100,000 reward for infor-
mation leading to the arrest and conviction of abortion clinic
terrorists... I assert that my defensive action as Security Guard
at the Preterm, Inc. clinic in Brookline, MA on Friday, Decem-
ber 30, 1994 effected the capture from suspectJohn Salvi of crit-
ical material and documentary evidence which led to his early
identification, [and] apprehension, and will be a great asset in
his ultimate conviction. My action on December 30, which jeop-
ardized my own life and led to my injury by gunshot wounds, is
officially credited with saving numerous other lives as well as
helping to provide vital evidence in the case. My claim for the
reward is the one true and legitimate claim against all the world
and I request that the P.P.F.A. and the N.A.F. jointly make pub-
lic declaration to that effect and proceed to pay me the sum of
the reward with all due speed.. . I would like to salute both the
Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. and the Na-
tional Abortion Federation for their public spirit in offering a
reward which is a step in the direction of combating domestic
terrorism in the medical field.16
12 Commonwealth vs. John C. Salvi, III, No. 99518 (Norfolk County Superior
Court, guilty verdict entered on Mar. 18, 1996).
13 Id.
14 Id. at docket entry no. 224.
15 PPFA and NAF had advance notice that Seron was going to make a claim since
Seron had announced his intent to claim the reward in aJanuary 30, 1995 interview:
RichardJ. Seron of Quincy said yesterday he will apply for the $100,000
reward offered by two national abortion rights groups in exchange for
tips leading to convictions for clinic violence. . . . At Planned
Parenthood Federation of America Inc. in New York City, officials said
Seron is welcome to apply for the reward. But his request will not even
be reviewed unless Salvi is convicted.
Nell Porter Brown, Clinic Guard Sets Hopes on Reward, PATRIOT LEDGER, Jan. 31, 1995, at
5.
16 Letters to Ann Glazier, Director of Clinic Defense, Planned Parenthood Federa-
tion of America, New York, N.Y. and Gina Shaw, Media Relations Coordinator, Na-
tional Abortion Federation, Washington, D.C. (May 8, 1995) (on file with authors).
"Richard J. Seron of Quincy said yesterday he will apply for the $100,000 reward of-
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Almost a year later, Seron finally received a letter from PPFA,
dated April 21, 1996, informing him that his inquiry was being
processed.17 After another six months had passed, Seron's attor-
ney wrote to PPFA and NAF again on October 29, 1996, requesting
a response within two weeks. I"
Then the unexpected happened: Salvi was found dead in his
cell, an apparent suicide, on November 29, 1996.19 Savli's body was
found under his bed with a white plastic trash bag tied around his
head at the Massachusetts Correctional Institution at Cedar Junc-
tion, the state's maximum security prison in Walpole. 21 On Decem-
ber 20, 1996, Salvi's lawyer filed a notification of death and motion
to vacate judgment of conviction and to dismiss indictments. The
motion was granted on January 21, 1997.21 A public outcry
followed.22
PPFA and NAF ignored Seron's notices of claim and never no-
tified him of their decision. After waiting nearly five years, Seron
sent a final notice of his claim to PPFA and NAF before filing suit.2"
fered by two national abortion rights groups in exchange for tips leading to convic-
tions for clinic violence." Nell Porter Brown, Clinic Guard Sets Hopes on Reward,
PATRIOT LEDGER, Jan. 31, 1995, at 5.
17 Letter from Ann Glazier, Director, Clinic Defense & Research, Planned
Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., New York, N.Y. to attorney Stephen W.
Carter, Carter Law Office, Dedham, MA (Apr. 21, 1996) (on file with authors) ("I am
in receipt of your material regarding Richard Seron. We've had several inquiries
about the reward fund. We are processing those inquiries and I will be in touch with
you soon.").
18 Letters from attorney Michael J. Heineman, Mingace & Heineman,
Framingham, MA to Ann Glazier, PPFA and Vicki Saporta, NAF (Oct. 29, 1996) (on
file with authors) ("It seems that adequate time has passed for you to render your
decision. If your decision has been reached and is adverse to Mr. Seron, kindly notify
me immediately so that litigation may be commenced. If you have not yet reached a
decision, kindly advise me in writing of the information which you lack.").
19 Salvi's Suicide, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1996, at D4.
20 Id.
21 Commonwealth vs. Salvi, at docket entries 235 and 237.
22 David Talbot, Legal Loophole Voids Salvi Slay Convictions, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 1,
1997, at 6 ("In an emotionally charged legal technicality, the murder convictions
against abortion clinic killer John C. Salvi III have been voided posthumously, infuri-
ating the families of his victims."); John Ellement, Salvi's Record Wiped Clean, Posthu-
mously, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 1997, at Al, A7 ("In what may be the ultimate legal
technicality, John C. Salvi III's two murder convictions in the 1994 shootings at two
women's health clinics have been wiped out, with all criminal charges dismissed, be-
cause he died before his appeal was heard." ); Linda Shepherd, Salvi's Guilt Affirmed by
Jurors, PATRIOT LEDGER, Feb. 3, 1997, at 1.
23 Letter from attorney Barry A. Bostrom, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, Terre Haute,
Indiana, to PPFA and NAF (Dec. 30, 1999) (on file with authors) ("Pursuant to law,
and more than thirty days before filing suit, Mr. Seron is now giving final notice to
you of his written demand for relief, identifying himself and describing your unfair
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Seron received rejection letters from PPFA and NAF denying his
claim. They stated in part:
As we explain hereafter, there are numerous deficiencies in the
letter which make it both inappropriate and impossible at this
time to respond with any monetary offer...
1. Your letter provides no basis for concluding that PPFA
has any responsibility or liability for the reward referred to in
your letter...
2. In Massachusetts, it has been the law for more than 150
years that an employee's performance of actions that are within
the scope of his employment does not entitle him or her to a
contract claim for a reward...
3. In Massachusetts, it has also been the law that the death
of the accused pending appeal from a judgment of conviction
vacates the judgment ab initio. [citation omitted] That is pre-
cisely what happened in the case of Salvi, whose counsel filed a
motion to vacate, which was granted under well-established law.
Consequently, there was no "conviction" and the conditions to
21reward described in your letter were not met...
Seron filed suit in the United States District Court in Boston,
Massachusetts on February 25, 2000, in an attempt to claim his
$100,000 reward. 25 His suit stated five claims: specific perform-
ance, breach of contract, substantial performance, breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair and
deceptive practices pursuant to Massachusetts Gen. Laws ch. 93A,
§§ 2 and 9. In May, 2000, PPFA and NAF contested each count
and filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, citing the same arguments as set forth above
in their response letters. In June of 2000, Seron reached a settle-
ment agreement with PPFA and NAF, the terms of which are
confidential.26
and deceptive practices, the injury suffered, and enclosing herewith a copy of the
proposed complaint.").
24 Letters from attorneyJohn H. Henn, Foley, Hoag & Eliot LLP, Boston, MA, and
Jennifer Blasdell, Esq., Staff Attorney, NAF, to attorney Barry A. Bostrom (Jan. 28,
2000) (on file with authors) (the letters were identical except for the opening
sentence).
25 Richard J. Seron v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., No.
00CV10317 NG (D.C. Mass. filed Feb. 25, 2000) (dismissed by stipulation in June,
2000, upon reaching a settlement).
26 The Boston Globe reported that:
The security guard who traded gunfire with John Salvi at a family plan-
ning clinic in 1994 and was seeking the $100,000 reward offered by
Planned Parenthood and the National Abortion Federation for the gun-
man's arrest has settled his lawsuit . . . for an undisclosed amount, his
lawyers said yesterday... Seron was "pleased" with the settlement, Bos-
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The motion to dismiss filed by PPFA and NAF raised two de-
fenses. One argument was that Seron was only doing his duty and
therefore should receive no reward; and the second argument was
that because Salvi's conviction was abated by the court, Seron's ac-
tions did not result in a "conviction" as required by the reward of-
fer. The second argument raises two issues: (1) the definition of a
"conviction" in the reward context; and (2) the effect of abatement
on a conviction. These two defenses are the subject of this article.
They are important because they undercut the ability of abortion
providers and government to stop clinic violence. Thus, for abor-
tion providers to use such defenses in order to defeat a claim for a
reward, is to defeat the very purposes of a reward offer, i.e., the
discouragement of clinic violence and the successful prosecution
of persons who commit violent acts against clinics. If John Salvi's
suicide justifies invocation of the abatement doctrine, and the
abatement of Salvi's conviction disqualifies Richard Seron from re-
ceiving his reward, then the denial of the reward becomes Salvi's
revenge from the grave against the very informant whose testimony
resulted in his conviction.
The subject of abatement, and its effect on informants to
clinic violence, remains an important issue because clinic violence
continues. Although many clinic crimes do not make national
news, clinic violence has become widespread. In the past five years
there were two murders, five attempted murders, ten bombings, 25
arsons, 15 attempted bombings or arsons, 299 acts of vandalism, 23
assaults, 71 death threats, one kidnapping, 27 burglaries, and 162
stalking incidents, for a total of 632 crimes committed against clin-
ics and abortion providers.2 7 Most of these crimes remain un-
solved. The cooperation of informants is crucial if any of them are
to be solved.
DID SERON HAVE A DUTY TO STOP SALVI?
The first obstacle to Seron's claim for a reward was PPFA and
NAF's argument in their motion to dismiss that when Seron shot at
Salvi and caused Salvi to leave his duffel bag of evidence behind
Seron's actions were within the duties of his employment as a se-
curity guard. It should be noted, however, that Mr. Seron was not a
trom said, although the exact amount is confidential under the terms of
the [settlement] agreement.
Ralph Ranalli, Suit Settled in '94 Clinic Attacks, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 29, 2000 at B8.
27 NAF, Violence and Disruption Statistics (12/31/2000) <http://www.prochoice.
org>; see also, NARAL Foundation, Clinic Violence, Intimidation, and Terrorism <http://
www.naral.org>.
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public police officer, and had no duty as a security guard to stop
Salvi's attack. Even police officers cannot make warrantless arrests
outside their jurisdiction if they are not in fresh and continued
pursuit of a suspect. If they do so, they act as private citizens and
the arrest will be held valid only if a private citizen would be justi-
fied in making an arrest under the same circumstances. 28
But Seron has never been a public police officer of any kind.
Thus, he only has the authority of a private citizen, even when on
duty as a security guard. "A private citizen may lawfully arrest
someone who has in fact committed a felony. Generally, the 'in
fact committed' element must be satisfied by a conviction . . . to
deter private citizens from irresponsible action."2 9 Private citizens,
of course, have no duty to make arrests, but they may do so if the
suspect has "in fact" committed a felony.30
Seron, whether acting as a security guard, or as a facilities
worker, had no more authority than a private citizen. He had no
authority to make arrests, except citizen arrests. He had no author-
ity to shoot his weapon, except in self-defense or in the defense of
others. But "in order to deter private citizens from irresponsible
action," the law nowhere places a duty on citizens to defend them-
selves or others by use of force, and holds them to a strict standard
for their actions, subject to both criminal penalties and civil dam-
ages for any mistakes. Thus, Seron could lawfully defend himself
and others, but he had no duty to do so.
28 Commonwealth v. Claiborne, 667 N.E.2d 873, 876 (Mass. 1996):
When a police officer makes a warrantless arrest outside of his jurisdic-
tion, and not in, "fresh and continued pursuit" of the suspect within the
meaning of G.L. c. 41, § 98A, then he acts as a private citizen, and the
arrest will be held valid only if a private citizen would bejustified in making the
arrest under the same circumstances. (quoting Commonwealth v. Grise, 496
N.E.2d 162 (Mass. 1986)).
Id. (emphasis added).
29 Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Harris, 415 N.E.2d 216 (Mass. 1981) (citing Com-
monwealth v. Lussier, 128 N.E.2d 569 (Mass. 1955))).
30 The "in fact" requirement means that the suspect must be convicted if the citi-
zen's arrest is to be found lawful. If the conviction is abated, does that mean that the
citizen arrest is unlawful, subjecting the citizen making the arrest to civil liability for
false arrest? Since Salvi's conviction has been abated ab initio as if he were innocent of
any crime, does that mean that Seron did not have the authority to shoot at Salvi in
order to protect the clinic employees' lives, and that he is subject to civil liability for
assault and battery, or criminal liability for attempted murder? Without a subsequent
conviction of the felon, a citizen does not have authority to arrest a felon, and there-
fore he wouldn't have authority to shoot at him either. The abatement doctrine,
according to PPFA and NAF's argument, would make citizen's arrests and use of force
to stop felons inadvisable under any circumstances. Just how wide a swath should the
abatement doctrine cut in negating a conviction? Should it affect unrelated legal matters
at all?
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His employer had previously instructed Seron that in case of a
clinic attack, his duty was to notify the police, and he should never
use his weapon except in self-defense. Thus, his employer did not
attempt to impose any duty on its security guards to defend the
clinic from attack. This is a reasonable position since the clinic
might be held liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for
any mistakes made by its security guards resulting in harm to inno-
cent persons (e.g., false arrests, injuries, and death).3 '
Whether viewed from the law, or from his duty to his em-
ployer, Seron's actions in defending the clinic employees were be-
yond the call of duty, not the simple fulfillment of his duty, as
argued by PPFA and NAF. Even if he had a duty to defend the
clinic employees as a security guard, which he didn't, the facts
show that, at the time of the Salvi attack, he was off duty, did not
have his uniform and protective vest on, and was performing ordi-
nary inventory duties. He carried his weapon only because there
was no safe place to store it on the premises. He had no duty to
carry his weapon while off duty, even though he was still on clinic
property in another capacity. He certainly had no legal duty to fire
his weapon, whether in self-defense or the defense of others.
PPFA and NAF cited the old case of Pool v. City of Boston," in
support of their claim that "an employee's performance of actions
that are within the duties of his employment does not entitle him
or her to a contract claim for a reward."33 But in Pool, and the
seaman example cited in Pool, the Court concluded that claimants
were only performing their duty. 4 As shown above, Seron had no
31 The general rule of employer liability under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior for the actions of employees is as follows: "the employee must be subject to con-
trol by the employer, not only as to the result to be accomplished but also as to the
means to be used." Konick v. Berke, Moore Company, Inc., 245 N.E.2d 750, 751
(Mass. 1969) (quoting Khoury v. Edison Elec. Illuminating Co., 164 N.E. 77, 78 (Mass.
1928)). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 220(1) (1958), which defines a
servant (employee) as "a person employed to perform services in the affairs of an-
other and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the services
is subject to the other's control or right to control." When this test is satisfied, the
master (employer) may be held liable for the actions of the servant (employee).
32 59 Mass. 219 (Mass. 1849) (plaintiff was a watchman (a public employee) of the
city of Boston who, while in the discharge of his duty, discovered a person setting fire
to a building and prosecuted him to conviction. His claim for reward offered by the
city government for the detection and conviction of an incendiary was denied.).
33 Letters from attorneyJohn H. Henn, Foley, Hoag & Eliot LLP, Boston, MA, and
Jennifer Blasdell, Esq., Staff Attorney, NAF, to attorney Barry A. Bostrom (Jan. 28,
2000) (on file with authors) (the letters are identical except for the opening
sentence).
34 Poo4 59 Mass. at 220:
The defense to this action is, that the plaintiff has done no more than it
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duty to stop Salvi, by arrest or by force. He could have done nothing,
remained hidden, or exited through a hallway door from the storage room.
He could have hidden, like others who were present and aware of
the attack, without violation of any legal obligation. No action at
law could have been maintained against him for simply running
away and calling the police, or for totally avoiding a confrontation
with Salvi. "Therefore, the principle that performance of a legal
duty cannot support a promise to pay is inapposite and cases like
Pool v. Boston, 5 Cush. 219, 221, are not pertinent."3 5
The fact that Seron was an employee of a targeted clinic is also
irrelevant. This case is similar to that of Braun v. Northeast Stations
& Services, Inc.,36 which held that "even though plaintiff was an em-
ployee of defendant and was a victim of the robbery, nevertheless
he was 'eligible for the reward' which had been prominently
posted by defendant at its place of business. ' 37 In that case, the
employer had posted the reward offer at a service station with the
words "NOTICE $5,000 REWARD" printed in large bold type, and
in small type the words "A reward of up to $5,000 will be paid for
information leading to the arrest and conviction of anyone rob-
bing this station or the attendant on duty."3 8 By contrast, Mr.
was his duty as a watchman to do, and that a promise of a reward to a
man for doing his duty is illegal, or void for want of consideration....
The same principle has been applied to promises made to persons not
being public officers; such as promises to seamen, to pay them extra
wages for the performance of their duty.. . 'Every seaman,' says chan-
cellor Kent, in his Commentaries, (3 Kent, 185) 'is bound, from the
nature and terms of his contract, to do his duty in the service, to the
utmost of his ability, and, therefore, a promise made by the master
when the ship is in distress, to pay extra wages, as an inducement to
extraordinary exertion, is illegal and void.' (quoting Harris v. Watson,
Peake, at 72 (Lord Kenyon)).
35 Kaplan v. Suher, 150 N.E. 9, 10 (Mass. 1926). In Kaplan, a contract with execu-
tor for payment to plaintiff of one-half of the assets revealed by plaintiff was enforced
by the Court:
The case at bar is not an instance where the plaintiff was under legal
duty established by the law to disclose his knowledge to the defendant.
He might have kept silence without violation of any legal obligation
owed to the defendant. No action at law could have been maintained
by the defendant against him for simple refusal to reveal his informa-
tion. Therefore, the principle that performance of a legal duty cannot
support a promise to pay is inapposite and cases like Pool v. Boston, 5
Cush. 219, 221, are not pertinent.
Id.
36 93 A.D.2d 994 (N.Y.A.D. 4th Dept 1983).
37 Id.
38 Id.
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Seron, although an employee of the clinic, was not an employee of
PPFA or NAF.
In Braun, the New York Appellate Division held that: (1)
"[p] arties purporting to act seriously in the making of an offer will
be taken to have intended that the offer have meaning, and the
courts will attempt to ascertain the meaning intended and give it
effect"; (2) "[ilt was well stated more than a century ago that 'a
paper like this ought to be construed as the public, to whom it was
addressed, would understand it,'"3; and (3) "[i]t is well settled,
however, that 'motivation of a person performing the acts required
by an offer of a reward is immaterial, but consent to the offer is
vital.' "40
For the above reasons, Seron had no duty to stop Salvi and he
was not performing a duty when he did so. The same is true for
"employees" who rise to the occasion, meet danger head-on and
take the steps necessary to stop clinic violence at great risk to
themselves.
WHAT IS A "CONVICTION"?
A second obstacle to Seron's claim is the definition of "convic-
tion." The reward offer is contingent on the "arrest and convic-
tion" of the perpetrator. Everyone knows what an "arrest" is. The
concept of "conviction" has proven to be more illusive. The gen-
eral public may understand conviction to mean the verdict and
judgment of guilt entered at trial. But under the law in many juris-
dictions, a conviction is only final after the completion of all ap-
peals. The definition of "conviction" is important because it
determines: when the conditions precedent have been met, when a
claim for reward may be made, and ultimately, whether a reward
offer presented as a unilateral contract may be enforced by a wor-
thy claimant.
For example, the New York Supreme (trial) Court dismissed a
claim by Security Consultants, Inc. The security guards at the Vir-
ginia abortion clinic, where Salvi did a drive-by shooting, at-
tempted to claim a reward. The trial court rejected their claim on
PPFA's motion to dismiss because there was no "final conviction."4 1
The New York court noted:
39 Id. at 624 (quoting Farago v. Arthur, 43 How.Prac. 193, 197)
40 Id. (quoting 50 N.Y. Jur., Rewards, §4, pp. 490-491).
41 Security Consultants, Inc. v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 2, 1997, at 29 (N.Y. Supreme Court, Justice Cahn, granting PPFA's mo-
tion to dismiss due to abatement).
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Various courts have held that to entitle a party to an award of-
fered for information leading to the "conviction" of an offender,
there must be a final conviction which settles the guilt of the party, and
as long as there is an appeal pending, or the defendant dies pending an
appeal, there is no conviction within the meaning of an offer of a re-
ward.42 (emphasis added).
If such a "final conviction" is required, no rewards may be made to
informants until all appeals have been successfully completed.
Also, where the defendant dies during the appeal of his case, no
final conviction can be achieved.
"Final conviction" is a nice legal concept that creates several
problems when rewards have been offered for information leading
to "arrest and conviction." First, if a 'final conviction" is required, then
it renders reward offers inherently ambiguous. If lack of a final convic-
tion is a basis for denying offers of reward, then in order to avoid
ambiguity the PPFA/NAF offer should have read as follows: "A re-
ward of $100,000 is offered for information leading to the arrest
and conviction of the perpetrator, if and only if the perpetrator lives
long enough for all appeals of conviction to be completed." Otherwise, an
offer without such an express statement is inherently ambiguous,
deceptive and misleading.
As the New York Appellate Division stated in Braun v. Northeast
Stations & Services, Inc.:
Parties purporting to act seriously in the making of an offer will
be taken to have intended that the offer have meaning, and the
courts will attempt to ascertain the meaning intended and give it
effect. (citations omitted). It was well stated more than a cen-
tury ago that 'a paper like this ought to be construed as the public, to
whom it was addressed, would understand it.'(citation omitted). 4s
The average person would expect to receive the reward after a con-
viction at trial. They would not understand the offer to mean a
"final conviction" after all appeals had been exercised. Further, the
average person would not understand that the reward offer could
be rendered void by abatement, since the average person has never
heard of abatement, unless they live in Massachusetts. Such ambi-
guity in a contract should be resolved against the drafter of the
42 Id. (citing Scott v. American Express Co., 233 S.W. 492 (Mo. App. 1921) and
Stone v. Wickliffe, 50 S.W. 44, 45-46 (Ky. 1899)).
43 Braun v. Northeast Stations & Services, Inc., 93 A.D.2d 994, 994-95, 461 N.Y.S.2d
623, 624 (1983) (Court held that even though the plaintiff was an employee of the
defendant and was victim of the robbery, nevertheless he was eligible for the reward
that had been prominently posted by the defendant at its place of business.) (empha-
sis added).
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contract, especially when the drafter is a lawyer.' PPFA and NAF
drafted the reward offer without an express contingency regarding
successful appeal without abatement. "Courts should interpret a
[reward offer] to effectuate its spirit and purpose. An interpreta-
tion which gives a reasonable meaning to all of its parts will be
preferred to one which leaves a portion of it useless, inexplicable,
inoperative, void, insignificant, meaningless, superfluous, or
achieves a weird and whimsical result."4 5 Thus, under contract law,
such an ambiguous unilateral contract should be enforceable de-
spite the abatement of the conviction.
Second, if the doctrine of 'final conviction" is used to deny legitimate
claims for rewards by informants, then it results in making reward offers a
deceptive practice. If PPFA and NAF's offer of a reward was made for
the purpose of inducing citizens to come forward with case-break-
ing information, all the while knowing that informants will seldom
be able to enforce a claim for the reward, and only after all appeals
have been completed, then the reward offer becomes a deceptive
practice.46 If the "final conviction" doctrine becomes an excuse to
deny worthy claimants their just reward, the offer of reward may be
a violation of State Consumer Protection Laws like those in
Massachusetts. 47
44 Cambridge Trust Company v. Hanify & King Professional Corp., 721 N.E.2d 1, 8
(Mass. 1999) ("The 'offset' approach also comports with the principle that contract
ambiguities should be interpreted against the drafter, 'particularly [when] an attor-
ney drafts a contingent fee contract which he knows will be signed by a person with-
out legal training."' (quoting Benalcazar v. Goldsmith, 507 N.E.2d 1043, 1045 (Mass.
1987) (both were lawsuits to enforce contingency fee agreement)). The same princi-
ple applies here where PPFA and NAF no doubt consulted legal counsel before issu-
ing the reward offer to the general public, which is "without legal training."
45 Confidential Informant v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 1 (2000).
46 Ironically, this was confirmed by Ann Glazier, director of clinic security at PPFA,
in an interview with reporters when she stated: "We really want to encourage people
to be aware when violence happens so we can catch the criminal as soon as possible,
... If [Seron] did that, and qualifies for the reward, then I think he should get it....
Because the money is tied to convictions, the rewards are rare, she said." Nell Porter
Brown, Clinic Guard Sets Hopes on Reward, PATRIOT LEDGER, Jan. 31, 1995, at 5 (empha-
sis added).
47 One of Seron's claims was for unfair and deceptive practices pursuant to Mass
Gen. Laws. Ann. ch. 93A, §§ 2 and 9 (Card Co-op. 1994), which state in part:
§ 2(a) Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared
unlawful.
§ 9(1) Any person.... who has been injured by another person's use or
employment of any method, act or practice declared to be unlawful by
section two ... may bring an action in the superior court .... whether
by way of original complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim or third party
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Third, the definition of "conviction" even draws into question the
proper time for claiming a reward. If a claim is made before trial and
conviction of the accused, it will be deemed premature.48 If a
claim is made after conviction but before being affirmed on appeal
to the highest court, it will also be deemed premature because the
conviction is not "final." If the claimant waits until all appellate
courts have affirmed the conviction, the reward offeror will no
doubt claim laches and the statute of limitations defenses, just as
PPFA and NAF threatened to do to Seron.4 9 Thus, the proper time
to make the claim is at best unclear, and no doubt, subject to de-
bate and the risk of dismissal for filing too early or too late.
action, for damages and such equitable relief, including an injunction,
as the court deems to be necessary and proper.
48 As aptly stated by PPFA: "Seron is welcome to apply for the reward. But his
request will not even be reviewed unless Salvi is convicted." Nell Porter Brown, Clinic
Guard Sets Hopes on Reward, PATRIOT LEDGER, Jan. 31, 1995, at 5.
49 Letter from John H.Henn, Foley, Hoag & Eliot, LLP, counsel for PPFA, to Barry
A. Bostrom, Bopp, Coleson & Bostrom, counsel for Seron (Jan 28, 2000) (on file with
authors), and letter from Jennifer Blasdell, Esq., staff attorney for NAF, to Bostrom(Feb. 14, 2000) (on file with authors) both stated in identical words: "Your letter fails
to suggest any reason for [PPFA or NAF] to believe that the claim you assert would
not be barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. § 5A
(Law. Co-op 1992) (four year statute of limitations)."
This defense was not a serious problem in the Seron case and was not included in
PPFA and NAF's motion to dismiss. G.L.c. 260 §5A, sets forth the statute of limita-
tions that applies to claims brought under chapter 93A and provides that a plaintiff
must bring an action under G.L.c. 93A within four years of the date on which the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the appreciable harm caused by the unfair or
deceptive actions. Dwyer v. Barco Auto Leasing Corp., 903 F. Supp. 205, 211 (D.Mass.
1995).
The discovery rule triggers the running of the statute of limitations at the time
when the plaintiff was likely first to have had some knowledge of the harm. Franklin
v. Albert, 411 N.E.2d 458 (Mass. 1980). "[A] cause of action accrues at the happening
of an event likely to put the plaintiff on notice." Hendrickson v. Sears, 310 N.E.2d
131, 135 (Mass. 1974), cited in Breneman v. Wolfson, 10 Mass. L. Rptr. 634, 1999 WL
1203920, at 4 (Mass. Super. 1999).
While claims under the unfair trade practices law generally accrue at the time of
injury from the allegedly unfair or deceptive act, the discovery rule applies such that,
regardless of the actual time of injury, the cause of action does not accrue until the
plaintiff discovers, or reasonably could have discovered, that he may have been in-jured as the result of the defendant's conduct. In re Fidler, 210 B.R. 411 (Bkrtcy. D. Mass.
1997), vacated in part 226 B.R. 734.
The natural point at which Seron would have had notice of the harm (breach of
contract) was the point at which PPFA and NAF denied his claim. Since they never
gave Seron a determination prior to his filing suit, the statute of limitations arguably
had not even begun to run. Even PPFA's response to Seron's claim, in April 1996,
saying his claim was under consideration, was sent less than four years from the filing
of Seron's complaint. Certainly it was reasonable for Seron to wait another six months
for a determination. Thus, the limitations began to run no sooner than the fall of
1996, two weeks after his attorney requested a determination within two weeks.
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Fourth, public policy requires the denial of the enforcement of a con-
tractual term in order to protect the public welfare. If no reward will be
given until a conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, thereby elimi-
nating the possibility of reversal or abatement, very few persons will
cooperate, reducing the number of successful prosecutions. Few
potential informants will be willing to go to the trouble of becom-
ing a witness in a criminal trial, only to wait 5-10 years for a possi-
ble, but uncertain, reward. Thus, the "final conviction" doctrine
may be void as against public policy, as applied to reward offers
and claims.
This public policy exception rule was recently reiterated by the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Beacon Hill Civic Associa-
tion v. Ristorante Toscano, Inc.:
[I] t is a principle universally accepted that the public interest in
freedom of contract is sometimes outweighed by public policy,
and in such cases the contract will not be enforced. (citations
omitted) 'Public policy' in this context refers to a court's convic-
tion, grounded in legislation and precedent, that denying en-
forcement of a contractual term is necessary to protect some
aspect of the public welfare. 5
0
In order to accomplish the goals of offering private rewards, it
will be necessary to avoid the requirement of a "final conviction" in
order to permit an informant to receive a reward. The phrase "fi-
nal conviction" has been argued by PPFA and NAF to mean that all
appeals have been pursued unsuccessfully, and no abatement has
occurred. If the word "conviction" in the reward offer is given this
very technical meaning, then it is an implied contract term that
should not be enforced because enforcement of such is against
public policy. Enforcement of such a provision defeats the whole
purpose behind offering rewards to informants. If informants who
properly perform, sometimes at great risk to themselves, as did
Seron, do not receive their rewards due to the mechanical enforce-
ment of a technical requirement that the conviction not be abated
due to the untimely death of the perpetrator, then fewer infor-
mants will come forward, fewer convictions will be achieved, more
criminals will go unrestrained, more innocent persons will be
harmed by criminal acts, and more vandalism to property will
50 Beacon Hill Civic Ass'n v. Ristorante Toscano, Inc., 662 N.E.2d 1015, 1017
(Mass.1996) (citing Somerset Sav. Bank v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 649 N.E.2d 1123
(Mass. 1995)); Begelfer v. Najarian, 409 N.E.2d 167 (Mass.1980); Bates v. Southgate,
31 N.E.2d 551 (Mass. 1941); and Adams v. East Boston Co., 127 N.E. 628 (Mass. 1920)
("The test is whether the underlying tendency of the contract under the conditions
described was manifestly injurious to the public interest and welfare.").
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
occur.
5 1
For these reasons, it is important that the "final conviction"
requirement be legislatively or judicially modified in the reward
context. To demand a "final conviction" is to render offers of re-
ward meaningless.
SHOULD THE ABATEMENT OF A CONVICTION STOP AN INFORMANT
FROM RECEIVING A REWARD?
A third obstacle to Seron's claim for a reward was PPFA and
NAF's argument that Seron could not meet the "conviction" re-
quirement to obtain the reward because Salvi's conviction had
been abated. When a defendant dies while his conviction is on
direct review, it is Massachusetts' practice to vacate the judgment
and remand the case with an instruction to dismiss the complaint
or indictment, thus abating the entire prosecution.52 This proce-
dure is known as abatement ab initio. In this section, we will discuss
the history and policy of the abatement doctrine, why the abate-
ment doctrine should not block the ability to claim otherwise
proper rewards, and, at the very least, why the doctrine of abate-
ment should never be applied in the case of a criminal defendant's
suicide.
51 Even if the abatement was determined by the courts to render the unilateral
contract unenforceable, Seron had a claim for substantial performance. In order to
make a claim for the reward, an informant must perform immediately. He or she
must contact law enforcement, submit to an interview and investigation of the facts
revealed, testify against the accused at the grand jury, and testify against the accused
at trial. This is similar to the requirement of substantial completion in construction
contracts. A substantial completion provision lists certain conditions precedent to
payment of amounts due under the contract. Normally, all conditions precedent
must be met before the duty to pay arises. But, under the law, "the non-occurrence of
a condition precedent may be excused if (i) the occurrence of a condition was not a
material part of the bargain or (ii) non-occurrence of the condition would cause a
disproportionate forfeiture." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 29 (1981);
Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Bowes, 409 N.E.2d 185 (Mass.1980); Barry v. Frankini, 191
N.E.2d 651 (Mass. 1934); HCE Pepperell, Inc. v. Energy Management, Inc., 2 Mass. L.
Rptr. 351, 1994 WL 879544, at 3 (Mass. Super. 1994). Thus, when subsequent events
have rendered impossible a literal compliance with each of the preconditions for sub-
stantial completion of the conditions under a construction contract, literal compli-
ance with each condition should not be deemed to constitute a material part of the
bargain so as to effect a forfeiture of rights. To hold otherwise would be manifestly
unjust where the result is a disproportionate forfeiture. Id.
For these same reasons, to require the informant to fully perform, but deny a
reward due to abatement of the conviction, is to place a condition precedent upon
the informant for circumstances beyond his or her control in order to receive the
reward that is due. This is manifestly unjust because it causes the informant a dispro-
portionate forfeiture due to the abatement of the conviction.
52 Commonwealth v. De La Zerda, 619 N.E.2d 617, 618 (Mass. 1993).
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The Abatement Doctrine
Of the states that have addressed the issue, abatement ab initio
is the majority rule, where the conviction is set aside as a matter of
course. 53 The basic public policy behind this practice is to protect
the rights of persons who have been convicted, but whose right to
appeal has not been fully exercised. 54  There are two minority
rules. Some states dismiss the appeal, leaving the conviction to
stand.55 Other states allow the appeal to continue by substitution
of the defendant. 56
53 Jurisdictions that abate a deceased defendant's appeal ab initio are: Alaska (Hart-
well v. State, 423 P.2d 282 (1967)); Arizona (State v. Griffin, 592 P.2d 374 (1978));
California (People v. Keister, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 431 (Cal. App. 4"h Dist. 1996)); Colo-
rado (People v. Valdez, 911 P.2d 703 (Colo. App. 1996)); District of Columbia
(Howell v. United States, 455 A.2d 1371 (1983)); Idaho (State v. Stotter,175 P.2d 402
(1946)); Illinois (People v. Robinson, 719 N.E.2d 662 (1999)); Iowa (State v. Hol-
brook, 261 N.W.2d 480 (1978)); Louisiana (State v. Beasley, 438 So. 2d 1229 (La. App.
3 Cir.1983)); Maine (State v. Carter, 299 A.2d 891 (1973)); Maryland (Jones v. State,
486 A.2d 184 (1985) (limited to cases where statutory right to appeal is pending or
has not been exercised)); Massachusetts (Commonwealth v. De La Zerda,619 N.E.2d
617 (1993) (retained in discretionary appeal)); Missouri (State v. West, 630 S.W.2d
271 (1982)); Nebraska (State v. Campbell, 193 N.W.2d 571 (1972)); New York (Peo-
ple v. Craig, 585 N.E.2d 783 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1991)); North Carolina (State v. Dixon,
144 S.E.2d 622 (1965)); Oklahoma (Johnson v. State, 392 P.2d 767 (Okl. Cr. 1964));
Rhode Island (State v. Marzilli, 303 A.2d 367 (1973)); South Dakota (State v. Hoxsie,
570 N.W.2d 379 (1997)); Tennessee (Carver v. State, 398 S.W.2d 719 (1966)); Utah
(State v. Christensen, 866 P.2d 533 (1993) (but continues if restitution)); and Wyo-
ming (State v. Free, 260 P. 173 (1927)).
54 This rationale has been expressed in United States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d
126, 128 (7th Cir. 1977):
When an appeal has been taken from a criminal conviction to the court
of appeals and death has deprived the accused of his right to our deci-
sion, the interests of justice ordinarily require that he not stand con-
victed without resolution of the merits of his appeal, which is an integral
part of our system for finally adjudicating his guilt or innocence. [cita-
tion omitted].
55 Jurisdictions which retain the conviction are: Alabama (Ulmer v. State, 104 So.
2d 766 (Ala. Ct. App.1958) (court ruled "appeal abated" without saying more)); Con-
necticut (State v. Trantolo, 549 A.2d 1074 (1988) (appeal dismissed as moot since fine
uncollectible)); Delaware (Perry v. State, 575 A.2d 1154 (1990)); Florida (State v. Cle-
ments, 668 So. 2d 980 (1996)); Georgia (Harris v. State,194 S.E.2d 76 (1972)); Indi-
ana (Whitehouse v. State, 364 N.E.2d 1015 (1977)); Kentucky (Royce v.
Commonwealth, 577 S.W.2d 615 (1979)); Michigan (People v. Peters, 537 N.W.2d 160
(1995)); Minnesota (In re Carlton, 171 N.W.2d 727 (1969)); Montana (State v.
Cripps, 582 P.2d 312 (1978)); New Hampshire (State v. Poulos, 88 A.2d 860 (1952)
(court ruled "appeal abated" without saying more)); North Dakota (State v. Dalman,
520 N.W.2d 860 (1994) (post-conviction appeal)); Oregon (State v. Kaiser, 683 P.2d
1004 (1984)); South Carolina (State v. Anderson, 314 S.E.2d 597 (1984)); and Texas
(Polhemus v. State, 659 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983)).
56 States which permit the appeal to continue subsequent to the defendant's death
are: Hawaii (State v. Makaila, 897 P.2d 967 (1995)); Kansas (State v. Jones, 551 P.2d
801(1976)); Mississippi (Gollott v. State, 646 So. 2d 1297 (1994) (defaults to abate-
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Many state courts applying the majority rule of abatement ab
initio cite the seminal United States Supreme Court decision of
Durham v. United States,-7 which established the abatement ab initio
doctrine. Durham held that the death of a criminal defendant
pending appeal of his conviction abated not only the appeal but
also all prosecutorial proceedings since its inception. 5' The defen-
ment status if no motion to substitute filed)); New Jersey (City of Newark v.
Pulverman, 95 A.2d 889 (1953)); New Mexico (State v. Salazar, 945 P.2d 996 (1997));
Ohio (State v. McGettrick, 509 N.E.2d 378 (1987)); Pennsylvania (Commonwealth v.
Bizzaro, 535 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super 1987)); and Wisconsin (State v. McDonald, 424
N.W.2d 411 (1988)).
57 401 U.S. 481 (1971). In addition to being the majority rule in state courts,
abatement ab initio continues to be the majority rule in federal jurisdictions. See
Clarke v. United States, 915 F.2d 699 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Mollica, 849
F.2d 723 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Wilcox, 783 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Littlefield, 594
F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Bechtel, 547 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Davis, 953 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Logal, 106 F.3d
1547 (11 th Cir. 1997). See alsoJoseph Sauder, How a Criminal Defendant's Death Pend-
ing Direct Appeal Affects the Victim's Right to Restitution Under the Abatement Ab Initio Doc-
trine, 71 TEMP L. REv. 347, 350-54 (1998) (general overview of history of abatement
doctrine).
58 Id. at 483. As noted in an article by David Pureza, Mississippi Allows Any Party to
File Motion for Substitution Upon Death of Criminal Defendant and Adopts Abatement Ab
Initio as Default Rule, 64 Miss. L.J. 819, 821 n.15 (1995):
The United States Supreme Court employed the abatement ab initio
doctrine as early as 1888. See List v. Pennsylvania, 131 U.S. 396, 396(1888) (dismissing writ of error and holding that cause abated upon
death of defendant). Numerous early decisions said nothing more than
that the cause abated upon the defendant's death. See, e.g., Johnson v.
State, 214 U.S. 485, 485 (1909) (stating that appeal abated upon death
of defendant and dismissing case); Menken v. Adanta, 131 U.S. 405, 405
(1889) (considering cause abated upon death of plaintiff in error);
Rossi v. United States, 21 F.2d 747, 747 (8th Cir. 1927) (stating that
death of plaintiff in error abated causes); McGovern v. United States,
280 F. 73, 76 (7th Cir. 1922) (finding that judgments abated as to defen-
dant who died prior to hearing); Pino v. United States, 278 F. 479, 483
(7th Cir. 1921) (finding that death of defendant abated judgment);
United States v. Dunne, 173 F. 254, 258 (9th Cir. 1909) (holding that
entire action abated upon defendant's death); accord Crooker v. United
States, 325 F.2d 318, 319 (8th Cir. 1963) (holding that causes abated
when defendant died during pendency of two criminal appeals); cf.
Mintzes v. Buchanon, 471 U.S. 154, 154 (1985) (vacating order granting
writ of certiorari upon respondent's death and dismissing petition for
certiorari); United States v. Oberlin, 718 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1983)
(holding that death of defendant prior to filing of notice of appeal
abated prosecution ab initio where defendant possessed appeal of right
from conviction). Other [appellate courts] have remanded such cases
to lower courts with instructions "for such disposition as law and justice
require." Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 346 (1945); accord
United States v.Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 520 (1943) (remanding to lower
court "for proper disposition in accordance with" majority opinion).
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dant in Durham died pending his writ of certiorari." In its deci-
sion, the Supreme Court praised the federal courts' adoption of
abatement ab initio and instructed the lower court to dismiss the
indictment.6o The Court found the distinction between a direct
appeal as of right and a petition for certiorari unimportant since
the death of the defendant would prevent review of the conviction
on the merits. Thus, the Court abated the proceedings from the
beginning even though the cases involved a petition for certiorari
rather than an appeal of right.6 But, this was not a unanimous
decision. In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the petition
should.be dismissed rather than the indictment.6 2 Blackmun be-
lieved that the majority failed to consider the distinction between a
defendant's direct right to appeal and the Supreme Court's discre-
tionary power to grant certiorari.6" Because of that distinction and
because Durham's conviction was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit,
Justice Blackmun asserted that the petition, alone, should be dis-
missed; whereas, the conviction should be permitted to stand.64
Five years later, the Supreme Court in Dove v. United States6 5
adopted Blackmun's dissent and dismissed a petition for writ of
certiorari upon notice that the petitioner had died pending his pe-
tition for writ of certiorari, thus, overruling Durham to the extent it
was inconsistent with the Court's ruling in Dove. "These two deci-
sions have been distinguished by the lower federal courts and state
courts as Durham providing the rule for death of a defendant pend-
ing an appeal of right, or direct review, and Dove providing the rule
for the death of a defendant pending discretionary review."66
The abatement ab initio doctrine has several significant effects:
59 Durham, 401 U.S. at 481.
60 Id. at 483.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 484 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 484-85 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65 423 U.S. 325, 325 (1976) (per curiam).
66 State v. Hoxsie, 570 N.W.2d 379, 380-81 (S.D. 1997). At first, the Dove Court's
one paragraph opinion created confusion. Where the defendant died pending ap-
peal, the Dove ruling did not make clear whether it applied only to petitions for certio-
rari pending before the Supreme Court or to all cases, regardless of their appellate
posture. However, one year later, the Seventh Circuit clarified the Dove ruling in
United States v. Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d 126. The Moehlenkamp Court distinguished ap-
peals of right (at issue in Moehlenkamp) from petitions for certiorari (at issue in Dove),
recognizing the greater significance of a defendant's first appeal opportunity. The
Seventh Circuit did "not believe that the Court's cryptic statement in Dove was meant
to alter the longstanding and unanimous view of the lower federal courts that the
death of an appellant during the pendency of his appeal of right.., abates the entire
course of the proceedings . . . ." Moehlenkamp, 557 F.2d at 128. Thus, the Court
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"(1) wiping the slate clean, as it were, restores the decedent's 'good
name' to some extent; (2) abating the conviction forecloses a po-
tential plaintiff from using the abated conviction in a civil action;
... (3) if the trial court levies a fine, abatement ab initio precludes
attendant recovery";6 7 (4) in some jurisdictions, abating the convic-
tion abates a restitution order along with all criminal proceedings,
thus precluding the victim from being compensated for losses in-
curred as a result of the defendant's conduct; and (5) abatement
ab initio may preclude an informant from receiving his otherwise
proper claim for a reward.
The Effect of Abatement in the Salvi Case
The doctrine of abatement ab initio does not justify denial of a
reward to an otherwise deserving informant. The extent of this
problem is illustrated by the attempt of Security Consultants, Inc.,
to claim an award based on Salvi's botched Hillcrest Clinic shoot-
ing spree that took place at the Bel-Aire building in downtown Nor-
folk, Virginia.6" Security Consultants alleged that its security
guards, in reliance upon the award offer, had "provided informa-
tion that led to the apprehension and subsequent conviction of
Salvi for the Massachusetts shootings."6 9 The lawsuit was com-
menced after Salvi's death. Just as in the Seron case, Planned
Parenthood filed a motion to dismiss the complaint because "the
terms and conditions of the reward offer were not satisfied since
the conviction was vacated ab initio."7 °
The Supreme (trial) Court of New York County dismissed the
case holding:
In New York and Massachusetts, as in many states, in crimi-
nal cases, the death of the accused pending an appeal from a
judgment of conviction abates the prosecution ab initio (cita-
tions omitted). This abatement has the effect of entirely elimi-
nating the jury verdict and the sentence of the trial court
(citation omitted).
The complaint states that the Reward Offer was 'for infor-
mation leading to the conviction of anyone involved in the slay-
ings at the [clinics] . . .' (emphasis added). Various courts have
vacated the conviction and remanded the case to the district court to dismiss the
indictment.
67 Sauder, supra note 57, at 353.
68 Security Consultants, Inc. v. Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc.,
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 2, 1997, at 29 (Justice Cahn).
69 Id.
70 Id.
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held that to entitle a party to an award offered for information
leading to the 'conviction' of an offender, there must be a final
conviction which settles the guilt of the party, and as long as there
is an appeal pending, or the defendant dies pending an appeal, there is
no conviction within the meaning of an offer of a reward (citation
omitted).
... IT] he purpose of the reward offer was to obtain a conviction
of the guilty party. That purpose is not attained where, as in this
case, the conviction has been declared entirely abated due to
the death of the defendant during the pendency of the
appeal....
Security Consultants is bound by the plain meaning of the Re-
ward Offer, i.e., that the reward would only be paid upon a final
conviction. Accordingly, the complaint is dismissed as Security
Consultant's cause of action never accrued due to the abatement
of Salvi's conviction.
7 1
The Security Consultants court, in analyzing whether an other-
wise proper reward should be abated with the conviction, simply
held that because the conviction had been abated, no claim for
reward could be successful.
Five reasons why abatement should not defeat an otherwise proper
claim for reward by a deserving informant.
First, abatement of a conviction is irrelevant and immaterial. A crim-
inal defendant's death pending direct appeal should not render an
informant's performance invalid or incomplete. For example,
Seron performed the unilateral contract by providing information
and testimony leading to the identification, arrest, and conviction
of Salvi. The conviction was never overturned. The fact that it was
abated due to the suicide of Salvi is irrelevant and immaterial to
Seron's claim for the reward. Salvi's suicide, and the abatement of
conviction as a result, should not render Seron's performance inva-
lid or incomplete. He performed the contract; he should reap the
reward.
Second, a mechanical application of the abatement rule leads to a
harsh result.72 The informant is required to come forward, cooper-
71 1d. (emphasis added).
72 One of Seron's claims was for substantial performance. The concept arises by
analogy from the law of construction contracts. See, e.g., PDM Mechanical Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. Suffolk Construction Company, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Mass. App. 1993):
'Quantum meruit is a theory of recovery, not a cause of action. It is a
claim independent of an assertion for damages under the contract, al-
though both claims have as a common basis the contract itself. Recov-
ery under this theory is derived from the principles of equity and
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ate with the investigation, testify at the grand jury, and finally, the
trial. After fully performing all of his duties to qualify for the re-
ward, abatement may nevertheless act to deny the fully cooperative
informant a reward. The abatement factor is utterly beyond the
control of the informant. A reward for material information lead-
ing to the arrest and conviction of a perpetrator should not be de-
nied due to circumstances beyond the control of the informant. Why
should the informant's reward be contingent on events beyond his
control? Informants should not have to guarantee the whole trial
and appeal process in order to receive a well-deserved reward.
Third, the public policy behind the abatement doctrine is irrelevant to
the public policy behind the offering of rewards to informants. PPFA and
NAF argued that the reward offer required a "conviction" to result
from the information provided by the informant, which they ex-
plain to mean a "final conviction," one upheld on appeal, and not
abated due to the death of the convicted person. But, the public
policy behind offering private rewards is (1) to protect the public
from crime (e.g., clinic employees and patients), (2) to protect pri-
vate property (e.g., abortion and family planning clinics), (3) to
discourage crime by successfully prosecuting perpetrators of crime
(e.g., clinic violence), (4) to assist law enforcement in obtaining
convictions, by (5) encouraging informants to come forward with
information relevant and material to the identification and prose-
cution of the perpetrator. "[E] ncouragement can help strengthen
our communities; there is a benefit to society to be gained from
fairness and is allowed where there is substantial performance but not
full completion of the contract. See generally 5 S. Williston, CON-
TRACTS § 805 (3d ed. 1961).' This theory of recovery is particularly
applicable in actions involving building contracts in order to avoid the
harsh result of the long established rule that there can be no recovery
on a building contract in the absence of complete performance. [cita-
tions omitted].
... Rather, a 'de minimis' breach would not necessarily preclude a
finding of substantial performance of the contract and, therefore, re-
covery in quantum meruit.
See also HCE Pepperell, Inc. v. Energy Management, Inc., 2 Mass. L. Rptr. 351, 1994
WL 879544 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1994):
Even were fulfillment of all of the conditions set forth in [the construc-
tion contract] considered to have been intended to comprise a condi-
tion precedent to [the contract provision entitled] Substantial
Completion, the non-occurrence of a condition precedent may be excused if (i)
the occurrence of a condition was not a material part of the bargain or
(ii) non-occurrence of the condition would cause a disproportionate forfeiture.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 29 (1981); see Johnson Controls,
Inc. v. Bowes, 381 Mass. 278, 280-81 (1980), Bary v. Frankini, 287 Mass.
196, 199-200 (1934).
Id. (emphasis added).
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encouraging each citizen to help every other citizen in need. ' 73 As
one commentator pointed out, even a Massachusetts court recog-
nized the public policy of encouragement, noting that the goal "is
to discourage calculated indifference to the plight of another
[which is] predicated on the social desirability of encouraging peo-
ple to go to the aid of third parties who are in danger of harm as
the result of the unlawful actions of others."74 This is a completely
separate and distinct public policy from that of the abatement doc-
trine. To say that rewards are abated with the criminal proceedings
is antithetical to the public policy of encouraging "man to save an-
other from mischief."
75
The public policy behind the abatement doctrine is thus irrel-
evant to the public policy supporting private offers of rewards for
information assisting law enforcement officials in obtaining suc-
cessful arrests and prosecutions. The purpose of a reward offer is
to encourage people with information to make that information
public, including testifying at trial, so that successful prosecutions
may occur. For these public policy reasons, abatement should not
be permitted to defeat an informant's claim where the informant
has otherwise met all the reward contingencies.
Fourth, it should be against public policy to permit abatement of con-
victions for felons who commit suicide. First, abatement actually en-
courages suicide. It is the only sure way a convicted felon can clear
his record before his appeals are completed. 6 Furthermore,
abatement appears to reward suicide. "[T] he public might believe
73 Mark C. Alexander, Religiously Motivated Murder: The Rabin Assassination and Abor-
tion Clinic Killings, 39 ARiz. L. REv. 1161, 1198 (1997).
74 Id. at 1197 (quoting Commonwealth v. Monico, 366 N.E. 2d 1241, 1244 (Mass.
1977)).
75 JEREMY BENTHAM, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, in THE COL-
LECTED WORKS OFJEREMY BENrHA 281, 293 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970).
76 "[A] convicted defendant could use suicide to ensure the return to the status
quo before commencement of the criminal action .... [A] return to that status quo
would justify the public and the victim, or the victim's family, in believing that the
defendant succeeded through suicide when he would have lost on appeal. State v.
McDonald, 405 N.W.2d 771, 772 (Wis. 1987). However, as one commentator noted:
To believe that an abatement rule encourages suicide would be an un-
justified presumption. Convicted criminal defendants have suffered the
turmoil and humiliation of the trial and conviction, and face incarcera-
tion or, at the very least, stigma associated with a criminal conviction.
One might reasonably assume that a defendant may perceive suicide as
an escape from further humiliation, stigma or incarceration. It is more
speculative, however, to assume that a defendant might commit suicide
in order to reap the remote benefits of abatement.
Lynn Johnston Splitek, State v. McDonald: Death of a Criminal Defendant Pending Appeal
in Wisconsin - The Appeal Survives, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 811, 830 (1989).
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that the defendant succeeded in vacating the judgment of convic-
tion through suicide."7" Refusing to abate the conviction in the
instance of suicide "avoid[s] the public perception that the defen-
dant defeated conviction through suicide."7"
In addition, when a reward is at stake, suicide is a way for con-
victed felons to deny informants of their reward. Hatred of infor-
mants and desire for revenge against them may be sufficient
motivations for some prisoners to contemplate suicide. "Abate-
ment in this circumstance allows the defendant to [ ] [punish the
informant] through his own self-serving, albeit gruesome
means. . . ,,7 Public policy should not provide even the slightest
encouragement for prisoners to commit suicide. Unless there is
evidence of incompetence, suicide should be considered a waiver
of the right to appeal, not a basis for abatement. The state's prom-
ise of abatement should not be permitted to become the induce-
ment of and reward for prison suicides.
Moreover, at the very least, an "exception should be carved
out of the general abatement rule where an appellant takes his own
life."8 ° The official investigation of Salvi's death concluded that it
was a suicide." Even strong advocates for abatement of restitution
have expressed the need for an exception when a criminal defen-
dant commits suicide pending appeal.8 2 This is because the under-
lying purpose of abatement - to do justice8" - is inapplicable
when "the defendant himself prevents a review of the merits." 4 If
77 Splitek, supra note 76, at 831.
78 Id. However, this "rule risks creating a negative public reaction if the criminal
courts continue to toil after the defendant has died. That reaction is likely to be
magnified when a public defender represents a dead defendant at public expense."
Id.
7q Sauder, supra note 57, at 373.
80 United States v. Logal, 106 F.3d 1547, 1553 (11th Cir. 1997) (Cohill, J., dissent-
ing) (upon death, restitution abates with conviction).
81 Salvi's Suicide, BOSTON SUNDAY GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1996, at D4.
82 Sauder, supra note 57, at 373.
83 "Abatement of all proceedings is based on the recognition that a defendant
pursuing an appeal of right has not yet received all of the safeguards of the judicial
system. Death prior to appeal works a deprivation of a final determination of the
case's merits. Because an appeal plays an integral part in our system for final adjudi-
cation of guilt or innocence, justice requires the abatement of a conviction where the
merits of the appeal are left unresolved." Splitek, supra note 79, at 816.
84 Id. at 823; see also State v. McDonald, 405 N.W.2d 771, 772 (Wis. Ct. App.
1987) (held when defendant commits suicide,justice does not require abatement of a
conviction); United States v. Dwyer, 654 F. Supp. 1254, 1255 (M.D.Pa. 1987) ("It defies
common sense to allow Mr. Dwyer to be absolved of criminal liability so carefully
arrived at by a jury because he intentionally took his own life before the appeal pro-
cess could run. By his suicide Mr. Dwyer waived his right to appeal."); United States v.
Chin, 633 F. Supp. 624, 628 (E.D.Va. 1986) (District Court found that a defendant's
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a criminal defendant deprives himself of his right of direct appeal
through suicide, his right to appeal should be lost. Such reasoning
is in line with the Supreme Court's decision in Molinaro v. New
Jersey,"5 in which the appellant in a criminal case became a fugitive.
In Molinaro, the Supreme Court declined to adjudicate the merits
of the case since appellant, who was free on bail, refused to surren-
der himself to state authorities and was a fugitive from justice.86
Fifth, because rewards are compensatory in nature, as opposed to pe-
nal, they should never be denied due to the abatement of the conviction.
This is analogous to the issue of whether a restitution order should
be abated when the defendant dies pending direct appeal. 87 Like
the issue of abatement, courts do not uniformly agree whether res-
titution should be abated along with the criminal proceedings
when a defendant dies pending direct appeal. In fact, the Federal
Circuit Courts are split on this issue. There are three general ap-
proaches regarding the issue of restitution. First, some courts have
abated the conviction while allowing the restitution to stand.88 Sec-
ond, some courts have abated the restitution along with all crimi-
nal proceedings.89 Third, other courts have abated the conviction
while allowing a substituted party to appeal the restitution order.90
United States v. Dudley91 is the leading case on this issue and
suicide after a guilty verdict and before further proceedings was a "conscious and
deliberate" choice, and refused to abate the criminal proceedings). But see United
States v. Oberlin, 718 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir. 1983) ("We also reject the government's
argument that Oberlin waived his right to appeal by killing himself. The contention
that suicide is the 'ultimate waiver" is without merit.').
85 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970) (per curiam).
86 Id. at 365-366. See also United States v. Corporan-Cuevas, 35 F.3d 953, 957 (4th
Cir. 1994) (defendant's appeal dismissed when he remained fugitive during appeal).
See generally Andrew Moriarty, TwentySixth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure - Appeals,
85 GEO. L.J. 1463, 1469 n.2544 (1997) (overview of cases discussing criminal defen-
dant's waiver of appeal when fugitive during appellate process).
87 See Sauder, supra note 57, at 354-74 (general overview of restitution in the con-
text of abatement and argument in favor of abating restitution, along with the
conviction).
88 See, e.g., United States v. Dudley, 739 F.2d 175, 178 (4th Cir. 1984)(restitution
does not abate upon defendant's death); Estate of Vigliotto, 870 P.2d 1163, 1165-66
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (restitution does not abate upon defendant's death); People v.
Peters, 537 N.W.2d 160, 166 (Mich. 1995) (enforced restitution order upon defen-
dant's death).
89 See, e.g., Logal, 106 F.3d at 1552 (upon death, restitution abates with conviction);
cf State v. Hoxsie, 570 N.W.2d 379 (S.D. 1997) (restitution order stands where defen-
dant pled guilty and then died pending appeal of his sentence).
90 See, e.g., United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 1997) (criminal
proceeding abates but court grants defendant's heirs right to continue appeal since
restitution survives); State v. Christensen, 866 P.2d 533, 536-37 (Utah 1993).
91 Dudley, 739 F.2d at 175.
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stands for the proposition that the defendant's death during direct
appeal does not abate a restitution order. In Dudley, the defendant
was convicted, sentenced and ordered to pay restitution.12 The de-
fendant died during his direct appeal and defense counsel moved
to abate the criminal proceedings ab initio.93 Although the Fourth
Circuit abated the criminal proceedings ab initio, it held that the
defendant's death did not abate the restitution order.9 4 The
Fourth Circuit hinged its decision on the distinction between fines
and forfeitures, which are penal in nature, and restitution, which is
compensatory in nature, stating that upon a defendant's death
sanctions which are purely penal are abated since they are for the
purpose of sentencing the convicted;96 whereas, restitution is "pre-
dominately compensatory" and designed to compensate the
victim.97
In this line of reasoning, abating the reward once a defendant
dies pending direct appeal is nonsensical. Awarding the victim res-
titution, although predominately compensatory in nature, does
have a penal aspect. For example, "[t] here is no doubt that an
order of restitution would cause [a] defendant financial pain, but
financial pain does not automatically render the order primarily
penal."98 The order of restitution is issued "to enable victims to be
compensated fairly for their suffering at the hands of convicted of-
fenders."9 9 Likewise, a reward is issued to compensate an individ-
ual for the performance of an act, which could quite possibly
subject him or her to personal danger or liability, such as the dan-
ger encountered by Seron. But unlike restitution, the nature of a
reward is in no way penal. It is purely compensatory and requires
the defendant to bear no burden in the informant's receipt of a
92 Id. at 175-76.
93 Id. at 176. Since Dudley, the Fourth and Third Circuit both held that attorneys
who represented the criminal defendant at trial lacked legal authority to act as his
agents after the defendant's death and thus had no standing to move to abate his
conviction. See In re Chin, 848 F.2d 55, 57 (4th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); United States
v. R. Budd Dwyer, 855 F.2d 144, 145 (3rd Cir. 1988).
94 Dudley, 739 F.2d at 179.
95 Id. at 177.
96 Id. at 176; see also id. at 177 ("The argument that impositions of penalties in
criminal cases have heretofore always been abated on death of the accused, even a
fully convicted accused who has not yet paid a fine or forfeiture, grows out of the
consideration that punishment, incarceration, or rehabilitation have heretofore
largely been the exclusive purposes of sentences and so ordinarily should be abated
upon death for shuffling off the mortal coil completely forecloses punishment, incar-
ceration, or rehabilitation, this side of the grave at any rate.").
97 Id. at 177.
98 Peters, 537 N.W.2d at 165
99 Id. at 165.
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reward. If the dichotomy between being "penal" and "compensa-
tory" is significant in determining whether restitution should be
abated along with other criminal proceedings, the analysis is
equally applicable in the context of rewards.
In contrast to Dudley, in United States v. Logal,'°° the Eleventh
Circuit held that restitution should be abated. In Logal, a defen-
dant, found guilty of securities fraud, was sentenced to imprison-
ment, ordered to pay a nominal fine and provide restitution in
excess of $21 million. The day before beginning his sentence, the
defendant committed suicide. Due to his savvy move, the defen-
dant was able to avoid a conviction, avoid paying the fine, and
avoid making restitution to the victim. Directly opposed to the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Dudley, the Eleventh Circuit, nakedly
relying on its own precedent, held "that 'though restitution resem-
bles a judgment for the benefit of a victim, it is penal, rather than
compensatory."',' The Logal Court found that restitution was pe-
nal in nature despite the fact that it was designed to compensate
the victim under the Victim and Witness Protection Act.'0 2 Since
rewards, in contrast to restitution, are undeniably compensatory in
nature, the Logal decision cannot be used for the proposition that
abatement should defeat a claim for a reward by an informant.
Taking the middle of the road, but not deviating too far from
the Dudley Court, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Mmahat,10 3
abated only the portion of the defendant's criminal proceeding
unrelated to the restitution order"0 4 when the defendant, who was
ordered to pay restitution, died pending direct appeal. The Fifth
Circuit held that "[w]hen [ ] [restitution] is designed to make his
victims whole, [ ] it is compensatory and survives his death. In such
a case, only the portion of the proceedings unrelated to the restitu-
100 106 F.3d 1547 (11th Cir. 1997).
101 Id. at 1552 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 983 F.2d 216, 220 (11th Cir.
1993)).
102 The Court honed in on two issues in abating the restitution order. First, it
stated that a statutory problem would arise if the court abated the conviction and let
restitution stand since the specific restitution statute at issue required a conviction
before a defendant could be ordered to pay restitution. Logal, 106 F.3d at 1552. Sec-
ond, the Court reasoned that to uphold the restitution order would have violated the
finality principle outlined in Moehlenkamp, and a statutory problem would arise. Logal,
106 F.3d at 1552. In it's holding, the Eleventh Circuit maintained a hard-line stance
on abatement - death before direct appeal abates all criminal proceedings. This was
so despite a strong dissent by Judge Cohill urging the Court to create an exception to
the abatement rule where the defendant commits suicide. Id. at 1552-53.
103 106 F.3d 89 (5th Cir. 1997).
104 Id. at 93.
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tion order is abated."10 5
In determining whether restitution should be abated along
with the criminal proceedings, it is apparent that courts focus on
the dichotomy between being "penal" and "compensatory." Al-
though courts do not uniformly agree whether restitution should
abate along with criminal proceedings when a defendant dies
pending direct appeal, one thing is quite clear: if restitution is
deemed "compensatory," as opposed to "penal," it should not be abated.
Thus, likewise, due to their purely compensatory nature, rewards
deserve the same treatment and should never be abated. This analogous
precedent alone is strong enough to shield rewards from being devoured by
the abatement doctrine.
For these five reasons the abatement doctrine should not be a
vehicle used by PPFA and NAF to deny informants their just re-
ward. To pursue such an injustice is to defeat the very purpose of
offering a reward in the first place.
CONCLUSION
John C. Salvi III, when he committed suicide, may have been
attempting to cheat informant Richard J. Seron out of his reward.
If Massachusetts law, as Planned Parenthood and the National
Abortion Federation argued, permits him to do that, then Salvi's
revenge from the grave is a success. Consequently, if the legislature or
judiciary does not correct this situation, and permits the abatement
doctrine to be used as an ongoing vehicle to deny future infor-
mants of their rewards, then Salvi's revenge is complete.1"6 The legacy
of John C. Salvi III becomes the refusal of witnesses to come for-
ward with important information about clinic violence, or any
other kind of violence, because they know that reward offers are
merely illusory, and that the personal sacrifice of the informant, in
105 Id. at 93.
106 There was an unsuccessful effort in Massachusetts to void the abatement doc-
trine. See Carolyn Ryan, Weld: Salvi Can't Escape Justice, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 3, 1997,
at 1; John Ellement, Law That Voided Salvi Conviction Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.
4, 1997, at B2; Eileen McNamara, Legal Wisdom That's Foolproof BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 5,
1997, at BI; Carolyn Ryan, Panel: Death is No Final Escape, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 14,
1997, at 7 ("After emotional pleas from the families ofJohn Salvi's victims, a legislative
committee voted yesterday in favor of barring judges from throwing out convictions of
defendants who die awaiting appeal").
To remedy the use of abatement in denying rewards to deserving informants,
voiding the abatement doctrine is not necessary. The legislature only need pass an
informants' reward statute, permitting them to receive their rewards after a convic-
tion at trial. Such a statute would give notice to all persons and organizations making
offers of reward that a "final conviction" is not necessary under state law, and is not a
defense to any claim of reward by an informant.
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terms of time and risk,'" 7 is just too great."'
107 Seron's risk did not end when Salvi fled. For his acts of heroism, Seron was
listed on the offensive, intimidating, and ill-conceived website. The Nuremburg Files:
Alleged Abortionists and Their Accomplices, under the subtitle, Law Enforcement: Their
Bloodhounds (Oct. 28, 1998) <http://www.christiangallery.com/atrocity/aborts.html>.
The website declared: "Our goal is to record the name of every person working in the
baby slaughter business across the United States of America... Email us with your
evidence. Legend: Black font (working); Greyed-out Name (wounded);
Strikethrough (fatality)." Seron's name was greyed-out indicating he was wounded.
The rather direct implication being that Seron was a proper target for violent attack for his
role in stopping Salvi!
108 Members of the public agree. See, e.g., Arleen Johnson (Reader's Opinions),
Clinic Should Pay Seron, PATRIOT LEDGER, March 8, 2000, at 20 (emphasis added):
Referring to the clinic guard, Richard Seron, who was wounded by
John Salvi some five years past; it would seem to be the right thing for
Planned Parenthood to simply pay him the $100,000 reward he is
claiming.
It is wrong for large businesses and foundations to offer rewards to the pub-
lic but then hold out for years in an effort to avoid paying legitimate claims. This
kind of thing sends out the wrong message in an age when it is all too rare for
people to get involved and help others - especially when it's done at great per-
sonal risk as was the case with Seron.
See also, Ardith Caissy (Reader's Opinions), Planned Parenthood Should Pay Seron, PA-
TRIOT LEDGER, Apr. 3, 2000, at 6 (emphasis added):
Planned Parenthood appears to be conducting itself in a very cal-
lous and disreputable manner by not only refusing to pay Seron the
reward in question, but as he has complained, even refusing to respond
to his claim with an answer - yes or no - or to provide any kind of
reasonable explanation to the general public.
I can recollect that in the past, every time a clinic has been attacked or
threatened, Planned Parenthood spokespeople have gone on TV to denounce the
violence directed against "women's choice" and boast of their $100,000 reward,
which somehow never seems to get paid out to anybody. It is clearly a disgrace
for a private organization as wealthy as Planned Parenthood is to benefit
from unpaid-for publicity in this manner, and at the same time not be
held accountable for its promises to a member of the public.
To put this comment in perspective, PPFA reported "income in excess of expendi-
tures" of $42.3 million for the 1997-98 fiscal year. And for the accounting period
ending June 30, 1999, PPFA reported profits of $125.8 million on gross income of
$660 million. Lynn Vincent, Profiting From Losses: Planned Parenthood Rakes in Abortion
Cash, WORLD MAG., Apr. 22, 2000, at 36.

